Wittgenstein

Overcoming Structure and Agency
Talcott Parsons, Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Theory of Social Action
Anthony King
University of Exeter, UK, A.C.King@exeter.ac.uk

Since the 1960s, the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein has had a marked influence on the social sciences. As an important sub-field, the sociology of science has drawn extensively on Wittgenstein and he has become a key reference point in debates in the philosophy of the social sciences about structure and agency. There, a number of commentators have employed Wittgenstein's `sceptical paradox' to demonstrate that the dualistic account of social reality provided by major figures in contemporary social theory such as Giddens, Bourdieu, Bhaskar and Habermas is unsustainable; it is individualist. This paper acknowledges the importance of Wittgenstein but maintains that a critique of contemporary social theory consonant with the `sceptical paradox' was already present in the sociological canon: in the form of Parsons' utilitarian dilemma in The Structure of Social Action. Accordingly, the utilitarian dilemma is recovered for current debates in order to demonstrate the enduring relevance of Parsons. Indeed, not only did Parsons provide a critique of individualism compatible with Wittgenstein's, but he actually transcended it.