Wittgenstein

Two

NAMES, USE AND GRAMMAR
Wittgenstein IS fairly persuasive on the theme, which
is anyway pretty obvious, that not all words, and not even all
nouns, are names. He is on to something more subtle when he
shows in various ways how, even when we think we are clear
about this, many of the things that puzzle us in philosophy
are troublesome at least partly because we press questions
which make sense only on the supposition that certain words
are names. The question 'What is the meaning of a word?',
when it means 'Which object is the meaning of a word?',
arises under such auspices, as do the questions 'What is
(which something is) an intention, a belief, an expectation?'Still, some words are names, and Wittgenstein is neither so
clear nor so well understood in the places where he seems to
suggest that there is a great deal more to understanding a
name than knowing the object, or family of objects, for which
it stands. He says we must also know its use; but what is that?
Most of us could not, without help, get much beyond suppos­
ing that its use is to refer to objects like this, this and this; but
Wittgenstein is either sceptical about whether that is part of
the use at all, or uninterested in the fact that it is; and he
suggests that there is at least much more to the use of a name
than that, but gives us very little guidance on just what he has
in mind. What is this 'use', to which he alludes, but which he
scarcely describes?That problem arises from such passages in the Investiga­
tions as the following:6. I set the brake up by connecting up rod and lever.' -- Yes,
given the whole of the rest of the mechanism. Only in conjunc­
tion with that is it a brake-lever, and separated from its support it
is not even a lever; it might be anything, or nothing.

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Publication Information: Book Title: Understanding Wittgenstein: Studies of Philosophical Investigations. Contributors: J. F. M. Hunter - author. Publisher: Edinburgh University Press. Place of Publication: Edinburgh. Publication Year: 1985. Page Number: 7.