Underdevelopment is the state of an organization (e.g. a country) that has not reached its maturity.
Most Sub-Saharan African countries remain largely underdeveloped - street in Dakar, Senegal.It is often used to refer to economic underdevelopment, symptoms of which include lack of access to job opportunities, health care, drinkable water, food, education and housing.
Overview
Underdevelopment takes place when resources are not used to their full socio-economic potential, with the result that local or regional development is slower in most cases than it should be. Furthermore, it results from the complex interplay of internal and external factors that allow less developed countries only a lop-sided development progression. Underdeveloped nations are characterized by a wide disparity between their rich and poor populations, and an unhealthy balance of trade.[1]
[edit] Extended overview
The economic and social development of many developing countries has not been even. They have an unequal trade balance which results from their dependence upon primary products (usually only a handful) for their export receipts. These commodities are often (a) in limited demand in the industrialized countries (for example: tea, coffee, sugar, cocoa, bananas); (b) vulnerable to replacement by synthetic substitutes (jute, cotton, etc); or (c) are experiencing shrinking demand with the evolution of new technologies that require smaller quantities of raw materials (as is the case with many metals). Prices cannot be raised as this simply hastens the use of replacement synthetics or alloys, nor can production be expanded as this rapidly depresses prices. Consequently, the primary commodities upon which most of the developing countries depend are subject to considerable short-term price fluctuation, rendering the foreign exchange receipts of the developing nations unstable and vulnerable. Development thus remains elusive.[2]
[edit] History
The world consists of a group of rich nations and a large number of poor nations. It is usually held that economic development takes place in a series of capitalist stages and that today’s underdeveloped countries are still in a stage of history through which the now developed countries passed long ago. The countries that are now fully developed have never been underdeveloped in the first place, though they might have been undeveloped. [3]
[edit] Examples of Underdeveloped Countries and Regions
Political map as the Human Development Index.Africa
Africa is the second-largest continent on the planet (after Asia) in both land area and population—with more than 800 million people living in fifty-four countries. With a total land area of more than 30,221,532 km² (11,668,598.7 sq mi), Africa accounts for 20% of the land on the planet; its population accounts for one-seventh of the population of earth. It is also the most underdeveloped continent. [4]
Third World
The Third World refers to the technologically less advanced, or developing, nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. They are generally typified as low income, having economies dependent on the export of major products to the developed countries in return for finished products. These nations also tend to have high rates of illiteracy, disease, and population growth, and unstable governments. Many are at the bottom of the league in terms of human development, such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Kiribati, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.[3]
Afghanistan
Historically, there has been a deficiency of information and dependable statistics about Afghanistan's economy. The 1979 Soviet invasion and consequent civil war destroyed much of the country's limited transportation infrastructure[citation needed] and disrupted normal patterns of economic activity[citation needed]. Gross domestic product had fallen significantly because of loss of labor and capital and disruption of trade and transport. Continuing internal conflict disadvantaged both domestic efforts at reconstruction as well as international aid efforts. The country today however is beginning to make some progress. [5]
[edit] Theories
Modernization Theory
Modernization theory is a socio-economic theory, also known as the Development theory. This highlights the positive role played by the developed world in modernizing and facilitating sustainable development in underdeveloped nations. It is often contrasted with Dependency theory.[6]
The theory of modernization consists of three parts:
Identification of types of societies, and explanation of how those designated as modernized or relatively modernized differ from others;
Specification of how societies become modernized, comparing factors that are more or less conducive to transformation.
Generalizations about how the parts of a modernized society fit together, involving comparisons of stages of modernization and types of modernized societies with clarity about prospects for further modernization. [7]
Dependency Theory
Dependency theory is the body of theories by various intellectuals, both from the Third World and the First World, that suggest that the wealthy nations of the world need a peripheral group of poorer states in order to remain wealthy. Dependency theory states that the poverty of the countries in the periphery is not because they are not integrated into the world system, but because of how they are integrated into the system.
These poor nations provide natural resources, cheap labor, a destination for obsolete technology, and markets to the wealthy nations, without which they could not have the standard of living they enjoy. First world nations actively, but not necessarily consciously, perpetuate a state of dependency through various policies and initiatives. This state of dependency is multifaceted, involving economics, media control, politics, banking and finance, education, sport and all aspects of human resource development. Any attempt by the dependent nations to resist the influences of dependency could result in economic sanctions and/or military invasion and control. This is rare, however, and dependency is enforced far more by the wealthy nations setting the rules of international trade and commerce.
Dependency theory first emerged in the 1950s, advocated by Raul Prebisch whose research found that the wealth of poor nations tended to decrease when the wealth of rich nations increased. The theory quickly divided into diverse schools. Some, most notably Andre Gunder Frank, adapted it to Marxism. "Standard" dependency theory differs sharply from Marxism, however, arguing against internationalism and any hope of progress in less developed nations towards industrialization and a liberating revolution. Former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso wrote extensively on dependency theory while in political exile. The American sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein refined the Marxist aspect of the theory, and called it the "world system." [8]
Thursday, June 25, 2009
Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein's Logic of Language -
What "manner of man" was Wittgenstein? From the point of view of his logic of language, it does not matter. The Philosophical Investigations, whether written by Ludwig Wittgenstein or by Josef Stalin ("Some of the young comrades have asked me whether grammar is a[n ideological] superstructure on the [economic] base"), must stand or fall to the test of reason (criticism) on its own.
On the other hand, we do hope that the study of a man's life (character) will help us to understand his work in philosophy. But this is in some cases a delusion. Either a man's work is to be judged independently of the man himself (as in the case with mathematical-logic e.g.), or, as in the case of Socrates, the man is an embodiment of his philosophy (in which case by 'philosophy' we mean not only a use of reason but also a way of life; even then, however, Platonic-Socratic logic must stand on its own). Wittgenstein's work in the logic of language belongs to the first category.
What, then, is the point of this page? It is an historical aside, nothing more. (If it is suggested that there is a relation between Wittgenstein's religion and his philosophy that may explain why he set the limits to his philosophical inquiries where he did, I would be uncertain.) But, on the other hand, much of this page is as much about Wittgenstein's philosophy as about Wittgenstein the human being.
Note: nothing I have written here is intended to denigrate Wittgenstein, for whom I feel deep respect. But many of Wittgenstein's perceptions belong to a past age, one prior to the revolutions in the West that have allowed the common man to "forget his place", and therefore there is bound to be dissonance between Wittgenstein's views and my own. Wittgenstein was born in 1889, my grandfathers in 1887 and 1888. An historian (I'm sorry, I don't recall which) wrote that those who came before us doubtless had their prejudices -- but maybe their prejudices were different from our own.
Note: this page has been superseded in parts by other papers about the Philosophy of Religion.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wittgenstein's Religion - "What manner of man was he?"
Preliminary: Contrary to what Parak wrote, Wittgenstein was not following the Gospel by giving away his fortune, because the Gospel says that the rich man's possessions should be given to the poor. And Wittgenstein left his inherited wealth to his own brothers and sisters, who were far from poor. He did not assign his wealth e.g. to a pension fund for the workers, or to a fund for the education of the workers' children, in the industries from which his father had acquired his wealth and his father's children their privileges.
Wittgenstein was several times decorated for bravery in World War One, but there a great difference between serving in the infantry (as Socrates did) and serving in the artillery (as Wittgenstein did): it is one thing to kill men or be killed face to face, quite another to kill faceless men at a distance. Also, to me it seems that by far the bravest military act is to say "No" [i.e. to disobey an illegal or immoral order], and in this context I respect Keynes and Russell in a far different way than I do my great-uncle, a soldier slaughtered by a German H. E. Shell (which might as easily have been Austrian) in Malancourt, France, during an otherwise quiet day's advance of 27 September 1918, in a war Pope Benedict XV condemned as "useless carnage". Like sheep to the slaughter they went ...
Further, Wittgenstein seems to have entered the war for entirely personal reasons -- i.e. to face death in order to be shocked into becoming the "decent human being" he wished to be. Where in his philosophical writings -- or even in those remarks which he separated from his work in logic (now collected under the English title Culture and Value) -- does Wittgenstein mention Austria? Does a philosopher take "patriotic duty" as a matter of course, or does he give the deepest reflection to that question? There is no evidence that Wittgenstein did.
I make these remarks in order to show that I myself do not know "what manner of man" Wittgenstein was.
"... I doubt whether his disciples knew what manner of man he was."
Bertrand Russell about Wittgenstein. [Note 1]
Wittgenstein worked as a gardener's assistant at a Benedictine monastery near Vienna after he left school teaching, and, according to von Wright, he more than once considered becoming a monk [Note 2]. Whether one finds it plausible that Wittgenstein was correctly understood by Parak may depend on the picture one has of the kind of priest Wittgenstein would have wanted to be, of what the priests he respected were like.
"... in every village someone who stood for these things." In times of superstition someone like that could do a lot of good as a teacher and as an example. But in later times maybe not. But there really have been priests like that, and in other backward places there still are priests who are able to teach that:
Religious faith and superstition are quite different. One of them results from fear and is a sort of false science. The other is a trusting. (Culture and Value p. 72)
A friend of Wittgenstein's, a Dominican priest said prayers beside Wittgenstein's death-bed and at his graveside, and this gave rise to gossip after Wittgenstein death. But I think Wittgenstein's own attitude to all this was shown by what he told Drury in 1944: "I seem to be surrounded now by Roman Catholic converts! I don't know whether they pray for me. I hope they do." (Recollections p. 148) And this was in fact one of the remarks that Drury had remembered at the time of Wittgenstein's death and that had led to inviting the Dominican. (ibid. p. 171)
But although Wittgenstein said to Drury, "There is a sense in which you and I are both Christians" (ibid. p. 114) and it was the view of Wittgenstein's sister Hermine that her brother was a Christian, someone who wrote that "The way you use the word 'God' shows not whom you mean -- but instead what you mean" (CV p. 50) could not have reconciled himself to any of the Christian denominations with their required assent to various dogmas, e.g. to God the Creator, a doctrine which Wittgenstein said played no part in his own thinking (see Norman Malcolm's Ludwig Wittgenstein: a Memoir, 2nd ed. (1984), p. 59).
And even if Christian "religious pictures" were those that said most to Wittgenstein [Note 3], his admiration for sincere religious faith was much broader than his respect for the Christian faith alone. To Drury he said: "All religions are wonderful ... The ways in which people express their religious feelings differ enormously." (Recollections p. 102)
Wittgenstein's own faith was austere (or, to use his word, "ascetic"), that is, without dogma, with mythology serving only as life-guiding pictures. To Drury:
I think one of the things you and I have to learn is that we have to live without the consolation of belonging to a Church....
Of one thing I am certain. The religion of the future will have to be extremely ascetic, and by that I don't mean just going without food and drink. (Recollections p. 114, in 1930s)
The symbolisms of Catholicism are wonderful beyond words. But any attempt to make it into a philosophical system is offensive. (ibid. p. 102)
However austere it may have been, however, Wittgenstein's faith must have been deep because it lasted to the end of his life. Two years before his death, he told Drury:
I have had a letter from an old friend in Austria, a priest. In it he says that he hopes my work will go well, if it should be God's will. Now that is all I want: if it should be God's will. (ibid. p. 168, in 1949; cf. CV p. 57-58)
Wittgenstein often pointed out Drury's romanticism to him. But Wittgenstein himself was as romantic as anyone, e.g. reading Tolstoy on the Gospels during WW1 ("the man with the book") [Note 4], and wanting to emigrate to the USSR to help build a new way of life there. But, he said, "There is something childish in this, but there is also something good." [Note 5]
Alyosha in Dostoyevsky's romance The Brothers Karamazov undertakes the moral education of the boys of the village. But it is in no way easy for an educated and cultured man to work with peasants [Note 6] if he does not have the common touch. It did not work out for Wittgenstein, and he returned to Cambridge to think again about the logic of language. [Note 7]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bertrand Russell's view of Wittgenstein
Note 1: Russell made this remark in the context of polemic. He confessed to his dislike of finding himself "out of fashion", said that it was hard to accept this gracefully, and then went on to accept it ungracefully. Wittgenstein, he wrote,
was a very singular man, and I doubt whether his disciples knew what manner of man he was.
I admired Wittgenstein's Tractatus but not his later work, which seemed to me to involve an abnegation of his own best talent very similar to those of Pascal and Tolstoy.
His followers, without (so far as I can discover) undergoing the mental torments which made him and Pascal and Tolstoy pardonable in spite of their treachery to their own greatness, have produced a number of works which, I am told, have merit, and in these works they have set forth a number of arguments against my views and methods. (Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development, New York: 1959, p. 214-215)
Drury replied to Russell in his essay "Madness and Religion" (in DW). For a very different point of view from Russell's, see Engelmann's understanding of his friend Wittgenstein (which applies this "abnegation" also to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus).
Conceptions of Philosophy - Russell versus Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein's impact upon me came in two waves: the first of these was before the First World War; the second was immediately after the War when he sent me the manuscript of his Tractatus. His later doctrines, as they appear in his Philosophical Investigations, have not influenced me at all. (My Philosophical Development, p. 112)
I have not found in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations anything that seemed to me interesting .... [This philosophy] remains to me completely unintelligible. Its positive doctrines seem to me trivial and its negative doctrines unfounded. (ibid. p. 216).
In my view, Russell finds this philosophy unintelligible because -- apart of course from his not wanting to find it intelligible -- he is insisting on understanding (regarding) philosophy as a collection or system of doctrines, and that is exactly what Wittgenstein maintains that his philosophy is not. And, in my opinion, it is not: instead, it is definitions, metaphors and methods -- i.e. in a word, Wittgenstein defined a way of looking at things (i.e. from the point of view of grammar and sense and nonsense) and of asking questions from that point of view -- not a collection of statements (doctrines) about how things "really" are.
Russell conceives philosophy [i.e. defines 'philosophy'] as a collection of speculative theories allied to the sciences (in other words, metaphysics by any other name), whereas for Wittgenstein philosophy is what it was for Socrates: criticism of what you know, or think you know, [although] with clarity [rather than truth] as its ultimate aim. [This view was already expressed in the Tractatus, which Russell should have been aware of: "Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences." (TLP 4.111)] Russell wrote:
... as with all philosophers before [Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations], my fundamental aim has been to understand the world as well as may be, and to separate what may count as knowledge from what must be rejected as unfounded opinion. (My Philosophical Development, p. 217)
But in Wittgenstein's thinking there was a shift away from asking about the truth of philosophical statements (That question was set aside) to asking about the meaning of such statements instead (CV (1998 rev. ed.) [MS 105 46 c: 1929]). Wittgenstein had already written in the TLP that philosophy does not result in a collection of philosophical propositions but in clarity [4.112]. -- But why? Because "philosophical propositions" (Russell: "a proposition is anything that is true or that is false" [The Principles of Mathematics Chapter II, p. 12-13]; Wittgenstein defined 'proposition' as "any expression that can be significantly negated") are not propositions but are instead confusions about the logic of our language: they are expressions of conceptual confusion: they are neither true nor false. [TLP 4.003]
To "understand the world as well as may be" is the task of the sciences [In religion there are religious pictures, and in philosophy there are similarly perhaps metaphysical pictures, but neither type of picture is a proposition in Russell's sense of 'proposition']. Note that this was not Socrates' fundamental aim in philosophy (Phaedrus 229e-230a; Diog. L.), despite Russell's claim about "all philosophers".
As to separating "what may count as knowledge from what must be rejected as unfounded opinion", this is done in all the intellectual disciplines: it is called critical thinking; it is not a use of reason unique to the work of philosophers.
Wittgenstein's work is foreign to Russell's "fundamental aim". And because Russell was demanding to force Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations into a category they do not belong in ("positive and negative doctrines"), he found them uninteresting. That would be a purely philosophical reason for his incomprehension.
What "manner of man" was Wittgenstein? From the point of view of his logic of language, it does not matter. The Philosophical Investigations, whether written by Ludwig Wittgenstein or by Josef Stalin ("Some of the young comrades have asked me whether grammar is a[n ideological] superstructure on the [economic] base"), must stand or fall to the test of reason (criticism) on its own.
On the other hand, we do hope that the study of a man's life (character) will help us to understand his work in philosophy. But this is in some cases a delusion. Either a man's work is to be judged independently of the man himself (as in the case with mathematical-logic e.g.), or, as in the case of Socrates, the man is an embodiment of his philosophy (in which case by 'philosophy' we mean not only a use of reason but also a way of life; even then, however, Platonic-Socratic logic must stand on its own). Wittgenstein's work in the logic of language belongs to the first category.
What, then, is the point of this page? It is an historical aside, nothing more. (If it is suggested that there is a relation between Wittgenstein's religion and his philosophy that may explain why he set the limits to his philosophical inquiries where he did, I would be uncertain.) But, on the other hand, much of this page is as much about Wittgenstein's philosophy as about Wittgenstein the human being.
Note: nothing I have written here is intended to denigrate Wittgenstein, for whom I feel deep respect. But many of Wittgenstein's perceptions belong to a past age, one prior to the revolutions in the West that have allowed the common man to "forget his place", and therefore there is bound to be dissonance between Wittgenstein's views and my own. Wittgenstein was born in 1889, my grandfathers in 1887 and 1888. An historian (I'm sorry, I don't recall which) wrote that those who came before us doubtless had their prejudices -- but maybe their prejudices were different from our own.
Note: this page has been superseded in parts by other papers about the Philosophy of Religion.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wittgenstein's Religion - "What manner of man was he?"
Preliminary: Contrary to what Parak wrote, Wittgenstein was not following the Gospel by giving away his fortune, because the Gospel says that the rich man's possessions should be given to the poor. And Wittgenstein left his inherited wealth to his own brothers and sisters, who were far from poor. He did not assign his wealth e.g. to a pension fund for the workers, or to a fund for the education of the workers' children, in the industries from which his father had acquired his wealth and his father's children their privileges.
Wittgenstein was several times decorated for bravery in World War One, but there a great difference between serving in the infantry (as Socrates did) and serving in the artillery (as Wittgenstein did): it is one thing to kill men or be killed face to face, quite another to kill faceless men at a distance. Also, to me it seems that by far the bravest military act is to say "No" [i.e. to disobey an illegal or immoral order], and in this context I respect Keynes and Russell in a far different way than I do my great-uncle, a soldier slaughtered by a German H. E. Shell (which might as easily have been Austrian) in Malancourt, France, during an otherwise quiet day's advance of 27 September 1918, in a war Pope Benedict XV condemned as "useless carnage". Like sheep to the slaughter they went ...
Further, Wittgenstein seems to have entered the war for entirely personal reasons -- i.e. to face death in order to be shocked into becoming the "decent human being" he wished to be. Where in his philosophical writings -- or even in those remarks which he separated from his work in logic (now collected under the English title Culture and Value) -- does Wittgenstein mention Austria? Does a philosopher take "patriotic duty" as a matter of course, or does he give the deepest reflection to that question? There is no evidence that Wittgenstein did.
I make these remarks in order to show that I myself do not know "what manner of man" Wittgenstein was.
"... I doubt whether his disciples knew what manner of man he was."
Bertrand Russell about Wittgenstein. [Note 1]
Wittgenstein worked as a gardener's assistant at a Benedictine monastery near Vienna after he left school teaching, and, according to von Wright, he more than once considered becoming a monk [Note 2]. Whether one finds it plausible that Wittgenstein was correctly understood by Parak may depend on the picture one has of the kind of priest Wittgenstein would have wanted to be, of what the priests he respected were like.
"... in every village someone who stood for these things." In times of superstition someone like that could do a lot of good as a teacher and as an example. But in later times maybe not. But there really have been priests like that, and in other backward places there still are priests who are able to teach that:
Religious faith and superstition are quite different. One of them results from fear and is a sort of false science. The other is a trusting. (Culture and Value p. 72)
A friend of Wittgenstein's, a Dominican priest said prayers beside Wittgenstein's death-bed and at his graveside, and this gave rise to gossip after Wittgenstein death. But I think Wittgenstein's own attitude to all this was shown by what he told Drury in 1944: "I seem to be surrounded now by Roman Catholic converts! I don't know whether they pray for me. I hope they do." (Recollections p. 148) And this was in fact one of the remarks that Drury had remembered at the time of Wittgenstein's death and that had led to inviting the Dominican. (ibid. p. 171)
But although Wittgenstein said to Drury, "There is a sense in which you and I are both Christians" (ibid. p. 114) and it was the view of Wittgenstein's sister Hermine that her brother was a Christian, someone who wrote that "The way you use the word 'God' shows not whom you mean -- but instead what you mean" (CV p. 50) could not have reconciled himself to any of the Christian denominations with their required assent to various dogmas, e.g. to God the Creator, a doctrine which Wittgenstein said played no part in his own thinking (see Norman Malcolm's Ludwig Wittgenstein: a Memoir, 2nd ed. (1984), p. 59).
And even if Christian "religious pictures" were those that said most to Wittgenstein [Note 3], his admiration for sincere religious faith was much broader than his respect for the Christian faith alone. To Drury he said: "All religions are wonderful ... The ways in which people express their religious feelings differ enormously." (Recollections p. 102)
Wittgenstein's own faith was austere (or, to use his word, "ascetic"), that is, without dogma, with mythology serving only as life-guiding pictures. To Drury:
I think one of the things you and I have to learn is that we have to live without the consolation of belonging to a Church....
Of one thing I am certain. The religion of the future will have to be extremely ascetic, and by that I don't mean just going without food and drink. (Recollections p. 114, in 1930s)
The symbolisms of Catholicism are wonderful beyond words. But any attempt to make it into a philosophical system is offensive. (ibid. p. 102)
However austere it may have been, however, Wittgenstein's faith must have been deep because it lasted to the end of his life. Two years before his death, he told Drury:
I have had a letter from an old friend in Austria, a priest. In it he says that he hopes my work will go well, if it should be God's will. Now that is all I want: if it should be God's will. (ibid. p. 168, in 1949; cf. CV p. 57-58)
Wittgenstein often pointed out Drury's romanticism to him. But Wittgenstein himself was as romantic as anyone, e.g. reading Tolstoy on the Gospels during WW1 ("the man with the book") [Note 4], and wanting to emigrate to the USSR to help build a new way of life there. But, he said, "There is something childish in this, but there is also something good." [Note 5]
Alyosha in Dostoyevsky's romance The Brothers Karamazov undertakes the moral education of the boys of the village. But it is in no way easy for an educated and cultured man to work with peasants [Note 6] if he does not have the common touch. It did not work out for Wittgenstein, and he returned to Cambridge to think again about the logic of language. [Note 7]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bertrand Russell's view of Wittgenstein
Note 1: Russell made this remark in the context of polemic. He confessed to his dislike of finding himself "out of fashion", said that it was hard to accept this gracefully, and then went on to accept it ungracefully. Wittgenstein, he wrote,
was a very singular man, and I doubt whether his disciples knew what manner of man he was.
I admired Wittgenstein's Tractatus but not his later work, which seemed to me to involve an abnegation of his own best talent very similar to those of Pascal and Tolstoy.
His followers, without (so far as I can discover) undergoing the mental torments which made him and Pascal and Tolstoy pardonable in spite of their treachery to their own greatness, have produced a number of works which, I am told, have merit, and in these works they have set forth a number of arguments against my views and methods. (Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development, New York: 1959, p. 214-215)
Drury replied to Russell in his essay "Madness and Religion" (in DW). For a very different point of view from Russell's, see Engelmann's understanding of his friend Wittgenstein (which applies this "abnegation" also to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus).
Conceptions of Philosophy - Russell versus Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein's impact upon me came in two waves: the first of these was before the First World War; the second was immediately after the War when he sent me the manuscript of his Tractatus. His later doctrines, as they appear in his Philosophical Investigations, have not influenced me at all. (My Philosophical Development, p. 112)
I have not found in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations anything that seemed to me interesting .... [This philosophy] remains to me completely unintelligible. Its positive doctrines seem to me trivial and its negative doctrines unfounded. (ibid. p. 216).
In my view, Russell finds this philosophy unintelligible because -- apart of course from his not wanting to find it intelligible -- he is insisting on understanding (regarding) philosophy as a collection or system of doctrines, and that is exactly what Wittgenstein maintains that his philosophy is not. And, in my opinion, it is not: instead, it is definitions, metaphors and methods -- i.e. in a word, Wittgenstein defined a way of looking at things (i.e. from the point of view of grammar and sense and nonsense) and of asking questions from that point of view -- not a collection of statements (doctrines) about how things "really" are.
Russell conceives philosophy [i.e. defines 'philosophy'] as a collection of speculative theories allied to the sciences (in other words, metaphysics by any other name), whereas for Wittgenstein philosophy is what it was for Socrates: criticism of what you know, or think you know, [although] with clarity [rather than truth] as its ultimate aim. [This view was already expressed in the Tractatus, which Russell should have been aware of: "Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences." (TLP 4.111)] Russell wrote:
... as with all philosophers before [Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations], my fundamental aim has been to understand the world as well as may be, and to separate what may count as knowledge from what must be rejected as unfounded opinion. (My Philosophical Development, p. 217)
But in Wittgenstein's thinking there was a shift away from asking about the truth of philosophical statements (That question was set aside) to asking about the meaning of such statements instead (CV (1998 rev. ed.) [MS 105 46 c: 1929]). Wittgenstein had already written in the TLP that philosophy does not result in a collection of philosophical propositions but in clarity [4.112]. -- But why? Because "philosophical propositions" (Russell: "a proposition is anything that is true or that is false" [The Principles of Mathematics Chapter II, p. 12-13]; Wittgenstein defined 'proposition' as "any expression that can be significantly negated") are not propositions but are instead confusions about the logic of our language: they are expressions of conceptual confusion: they are neither true nor false. [TLP 4.003]
To "understand the world as well as may be" is the task of the sciences [In religion there are religious pictures, and in philosophy there are similarly perhaps metaphysical pictures, but neither type of picture is a proposition in Russell's sense of 'proposition']. Note that this was not Socrates' fundamental aim in philosophy (Phaedrus 229e-230a; Diog. L.), despite Russell's claim about "all philosophers".
As to separating "what may count as knowledge from what must be rejected as unfounded opinion", this is done in all the intellectual disciplines: it is called critical thinking; it is not a use of reason unique to the work of philosophers.
Wittgenstein's work is foreign to Russell's "fundamental aim". And because Russell was demanding to force Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations into a category they do not belong in ("positive and negative doctrines"), he found them uninteresting. That would be a purely philosophical reason for his incomprehension.
Urban Social Processes
Understanding Urban Development Processes: Integrating the Economic and the Social in Property Research
Simon Guy
School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape, University of Newcastle, Claremont Tower, Newcastle upon Tyne, NEI 7RU, UK, s.c.guy@ncl.ac.uk
John Henneberry
Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of Sheffield, Western Bank, Sheffield, S10 2TN, UK, j.henneberry@shiffield.ac.uk
In their treatment of development, researchers in the property sector tend to adopt positivist methodologies which emphasise the application of rational decision-making techniques by utility-maximisers within a mainstream economics paradigm. While considerably increasing our understanding of the development process, such research offers a partial view of its subject from a particular perspective. Recently, alternative methodological and theoretical approaches have evolved which strive to understand the wider institutional context of the development process. The paper critically reflects on these institutionalist approaches in order to develop a research framework which blends economic and social analyses of property development processes. The paper draws upon (re)interpretations of the authors' recent research to address the following points. First, that the economic structuring of development is a product of and, in turn, affects social processes. This is illustrated by a consideration of the price mechanism in the property market. Secondly, that social structures and processes are as important as their economic equivalents in 'explaining' property development. This is addressed by a discussion of the ways in which recent shifts in the social organisation of the property sector are reframing the strategies of development actors, leading to new structures of property provision and use. The paper concludes by arguing for the need to develop an understanding of property development processes which combines a sensitivity to the economic and social framing of development strategies with a fine-grain treatment of the locally contingent social responses of property actors.
Urban Studies, Vol. 37, No. 13, 2399-2416 (2000)
DOI: 10.1080/00420980020005398
Simon Guy
School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape, University of Newcastle, Claremont Tower, Newcastle upon Tyne, NEI 7RU, UK, s.c.guy@ncl.ac.uk
John Henneberry
Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of Sheffield, Western Bank, Sheffield, S10 2TN, UK, j.henneberry@shiffield.ac.uk
In their treatment of development, researchers in the property sector tend to adopt positivist methodologies which emphasise the application of rational decision-making techniques by utility-maximisers within a mainstream economics paradigm. While considerably increasing our understanding of the development process, such research offers a partial view of its subject from a particular perspective. Recently, alternative methodological and theoretical approaches have evolved which strive to understand the wider institutional context of the development process. The paper critically reflects on these institutionalist approaches in order to develop a research framework which blends economic and social analyses of property development processes. The paper draws upon (re)interpretations of the authors' recent research to address the following points. First, that the economic structuring of development is a product of and, in turn, affects social processes. This is illustrated by a consideration of the price mechanism in the property market. Secondly, that social structures and processes are as important as their economic equivalents in 'explaining' property development. This is addressed by a discussion of the ways in which recent shifts in the social organisation of the property sector are reframing the strategies of development actors, leading to new structures of property provision and use. The paper concludes by arguing for the need to develop an understanding of property development processes which combines a sensitivity to the economic and social framing of development strategies with a fine-grain treatment of the locally contingent social responses of property actors.
Urban Studies, Vol. 37, No. 13, 2399-2416 (2000)
DOI: 10.1080/00420980020005398
Social Theory
Social Theory and Social Structure (STSS) was a landmark publication in sociology by Robert K. Merton. It has been translated into close to 20 languages and is one of the most frequently cited texts in social sciences.[1] It was first published in 1949, although revised editions of 1957 and 1968 are often cited.
The book introduced many important concepts in sociology, like: manifest and latent functions and dysfunctions, obliteration by incorporation, reference groups, self-fulfilling prophecy, middle-range theory and others.[Merton, 1980]
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
Contents [hide]
1 Works
2 Awards
3 See also
4 References
5 External links
Piotr Sztompka (born 1944) is professor of Sociology at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland, and visiting professor at the University of California, Los Angeles.
Sztompka has also taught as visiting professor at Columbia University, the University of Michigan, Johns Hopkins University, the University of Rome, and Tischner European University.
[edit] Works
System and Function (Studies in Anthropology, 1974).
Sociological Dilemmas (1979).
Robert K. Merton: an Intellectual Profile (1986)
The New Technological Challenge and Socialist Societies (editor, 1987).
Rethinking Progress (with Jeffrey C. Alexander, 1990).
Society in Action: the Theory of Social Becoming (1991).
Sociology in Europe: in Search of Identity (with Birgitta Nedelmann, 1993).
The Sociology of Social Change (1993).
Agency and Structure: Reorienting Social Theory (International Studies in Global Change, vol. 4; editor, 1994).
Robert K. Merton, On Social Structure and Science (editor, 1996).
Trust: a Sociological Theory (1999).
[edit] Awards
New Europe Prize.
The book introduced many important concepts in sociology, like: manifest and latent functions and dysfunctions, obliteration by incorporation, reference groups, self-fulfilling prophecy, middle-range theory and others.[Merton, 1980]
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
Contents [hide]
1 Works
2 Awards
3 See also
4 References
5 External links
Piotr Sztompka (born 1944) is professor of Sociology at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland, and visiting professor at the University of California, Los Angeles.
Sztompka has also taught as visiting professor at Columbia University, the University of Michigan, Johns Hopkins University, the University of Rome, and Tischner European University.
[edit] Works
System and Function (Studies in Anthropology, 1974).
Sociological Dilemmas (1979).
Robert K. Merton: an Intellectual Profile (1986)
The New Technological Challenge and Socialist Societies (editor, 1987).
Rethinking Progress (with Jeffrey C. Alexander, 1990).
Society in Action: the Theory of Social Becoming (1991).
Sociology in Europe: in Search of Identity (with Birgitta Nedelmann, 1993).
The Sociology of Social Change (1993).
Agency and Structure: Reorienting Social Theory (International Studies in Global Change, vol. 4; editor, 1994).
Robert K. Merton, On Social Structure and Science (editor, 1996).
Trust: a Sociological Theory (1999).
[edit] Awards
New Europe Prize.
Sunday, June 21, 2009
Wittgenstein
The Architecture of Meaning:
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and formal semantics
Martin Stokhof
To appear in:
David Levy and Eduardo Zamuner (eds), Wittgenstein’s Enduring Arguments,
Routledge, London
1 Introduction
With a few notable exceptions formal semantics, as it originated from the seminal work
of Richard Montague, Donald Davidson, Max Cresswell, David Lewis and others, in the
late sixties and early seventies of the previous century, does not consider Wittgenstein
as one of its ancestors. That honour is bestowed on Frege, Tarski, Carnap. And so it has
been in later developments. Most introductions to the subject will refer to Frege and
Tarski (Carnap less frequently) —in addition to the pioneers just mentioned, of course—
, and discuss the main elements of their work that helped shape formal semantics in some
detail. But Wittgenstein is conspicuously absent whenever the history of the subject is
mentioned (usually briefly, if at all).
Of course, if one thinks of Wittgenstein’s later work, this is obvious: nothing, it
seems, could be more antithetic to what formal semantics aims for and to how it pursues
those aims than the views on meaning and language that Wittgenstein expounds in,
e.g., Philosophical Investigations, with its insistence on particularity and diversity, and its
rejection of explanation and formal modelling. But what about his earlier work, the
Tractatus (henceforth TLP)? At first sight, that seems much more congenial, as it develops
a conception of language and meaning that is both general and uniform, explanatory
and formal. In view of that, the general lack of reference to TLP is curious.
The central claim of the present paper is that, actually, this is an oversight. Perhaps
Wittgenstein was no conscious influence on the minds of Montague c.s. at the time,
but he did play a major role in establishing the fundamental principles and philosophical
assumptions that helped shape formal semantics and make it such a successful enterprise,
in linguistics and in philosophy. The actual channels through which this transmission
of concepts and ideas has taken place is not what we will be focusing on here. That is
another story, and a complicated one, which requires more historical knowledge and
skills than we can muster. Rather, we will be content with discussing some systematic
ILLC / Department of Philosophy, Universiteit van Amsterdam. I would like to thank Michiel van
Lambalgen and the editors of this volume for their helpful comments.
1
analogies (and differences, for there are those as well, of course) between Wittgenstein’s
conception of language and meaning in TLP, and the one that was prevalent in formal
semantics at its inception and that continues to exert a major influence in the field until
the present day.
The reasons for being interested in these connections are twofold. First of all, it
appears that formal semanticists do not always appreciate what philosophical assumptions
are behind their enterprise. This is deplorable since an awareness of that part of its
legacy could help formal semantics answer questions regarding its proper status as a
scientific discipline. The diversity that is characteristic of the state in which formal
semantics finds itself today, raises the question how this came about, and how it can be
justified. And part of the answer may well have to do with diverging ways of dealing
with the problems caused by these philosophical assumptions. The second reason why
tracing some systematic connections between Wittgenstein’s early work and the origins
of formal semantics is of interest stays ‘closer to home’, i.e., closer to Wittgenstein. At
many points in his later works Wittgenstein formulated penetrating criticisms of his
earlier ideas. In as much as formal semantics incorporates some of the latter the former
might apply to it as well. These are related but distinct considerations, that each in their
own way put formal semantics to the test: Is it really an empirical discipline? Or does it
remain rooted in its philosophical ancestry?
The approach taken in what follows is by and large systematic. In section 2 we
will review the main characteristics of TLP’s ‘architecture of meaning’ —what meaning
is, how it is structured, how its relates to language and to the world—, isolating three
aspects that are particularly relevant for a comparison with formal semantics. Section 3
contains brief sketch of the way in which some ideas from TLP were transmitted through
the work of Rudolf Carnap. Then, in section 4 we turn to a detailed analysis of the conceptions
that are prominent in the work of the pioneers of formal semantics. The focus
will be on the work of Richard Montague and Donald Davidson, but where relevant
we also refer to the writings of other authors such as David Lewis and Max Cresswell.
After this exposition we turn to an exploration of resemblances and differences between
TLP and formal semantics in section 5. Finally, in section 6, we will address the two
issues identified above: the consequences for the nature of formal semantics as a scientific
discipline, and the potential relevance of Wittgenstein’s own criticisms on the
TLP-framework for formal semantics.
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and formal semantics
Martin Stokhof
To appear in:
David Levy and Eduardo Zamuner (eds), Wittgenstein’s Enduring Arguments,
Routledge, London
1 Introduction
With a few notable exceptions formal semantics, as it originated from the seminal work
of Richard Montague, Donald Davidson, Max Cresswell, David Lewis and others, in the
late sixties and early seventies of the previous century, does not consider Wittgenstein
as one of its ancestors. That honour is bestowed on Frege, Tarski, Carnap. And so it has
been in later developments. Most introductions to the subject will refer to Frege and
Tarski (Carnap less frequently) —in addition to the pioneers just mentioned, of course—
, and discuss the main elements of their work that helped shape formal semantics in some
detail. But Wittgenstein is conspicuously absent whenever the history of the subject is
mentioned (usually briefly, if at all).
Of course, if one thinks of Wittgenstein’s later work, this is obvious: nothing, it
seems, could be more antithetic to what formal semantics aims for and to how it pursues
those aims than the views on meaning and language that Wittgenstein expounds in,
e.g., Philosophical Investigations, with its insistence on particularity and diversity, and its
rejection of explanation and formal modelling. But what about his earlier work, the
Tractatus (henceforth TLP)? At first sight, that seems much more congenial, as it develops
a conception of language and meaning that is both general and uniform, explanatory
and formal. In view of that, the general lack of reference to TLP is curious.
The central claim of the present paper is that, actually, this is an oversight. Perhaps
Wittgenstein was no conscious influence on the minds of Montague c.s. at the time,
but he did play a major role in establishing the fundamental principles and philosophical
assumptions that helped shape formal semantics and make it such a successful enterprise,
in linguistics and in philosophy. The actual channels through which this transmission
of concepts and ideas has taken place is not what we will be focusing on here. That is
another story, and a complicated one, which requires more historical knowledge and
skills than we can muster. Rather, we will be content with discussing some systematic
ILLC / Department of Philosophy, Universiteit van Amsterdam. I would like to thank Michiel van
Lambalgen and the editors of this volume for their helpful comments.
1
analogies (and differences, for there are those as well, of course) between Wittgenstein’s
conception of language and meaning in TLP, and the one that was prevalent in formal
semantics at its inception and that continues to exert a major influence in the field until
the present day.
The reasons for being interested in these connections are twofold. First of all, it
appears that formal semanticists do not always appreciate what philosophical assumptions
are behind their enterprise. This is deplorable since an awareness of that part of its
legacy could help formal semantics answer questions regarding its proper status as a
scientific discipline. The diversity that is characteristic of the state in which formal
semantics finds itself today, raises the question how this came about, and how it can be
justified. And part of the answer may well have to do with diverging ways of dealing
with the problems caused by these philosophical assumptions. The second reason why
tracing some systematic connections between Wittgenstein’s early work and the origins
of formal semantics is of interest stays ‘closer to home’, i.e., closer to Wittgenstein. At
many points in his later works Wittgenstein formulated penetrating criticisms of his
earlier ideas. In as much as formal semantics incorporates some of the latter the former
might apply to it as well. These are related but distinct considerations, that each in their
own way put formal semantics to the test: Is it really an empirical discipline? Or does it
remain rooted in its philosophical ancestry?
The approach taken in what follows is by and large systematic. In section 2 we
will review the main characteristics of TLP’s ‘architecture of meaning’ —what meaning
is, how it is structured, how its relates to language and to the world—, isolating three
aspects that are particularly relevant for a comparison with formal semantics. Section 3
contains brief sketch of the way in which some ideas from TLP were transmitted through
the work of Rudolf Carnap. Then, in section 4 we turn to a detailed analysis of the conceptions
that are prominent in the work of the pioneers of formal semantics. The focus
will be on the work of Richard Montague and Donald Davidson, but where relevant
we also refer to the writings of other authors such as David Lewis and Max Cresswell.
After this exposition we turn to an exploration of resemblances and differences between
TLP and formal semantics in section 5. Finally, in section 6, we will address the two
issues identified above: the consequences for the nature of formal semantics as a scientific
discipline, and the potential relevance of Wittgenstein’s own criticisms on the
TLP-framework for formal semantics.
Urban Social Processes
Vesselinov, Elena. "Gated Communities: The New Frontier of Urban Inequality in Metropolitan U.S.?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Marriott Hotel, Loews Philadelphia Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 12, 2005 Online . 2009-06-21
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Gating is a relatively new urban process, which has gained significance particularly in the last decade. The present study focuses on the contemporary link between gating and residential segregation in the context of urban inequality. It seems that by gaining significance as a social process gating if not replacing the process of segregation at least to some extent is becoming as prominent as segregation. Therefore the research question we pose is: Are gating and segregation two forms of urban inequality structurally correlated to a significant extent, thus manifestations of the same or different social disadvantages?
The results indicate that gating and residential segregation are significantly and negatively correlated and seem to be driven by different social structural mechanisms. Instead of reinforcing each other in cities, the two processes seem to be alternative forms or urban inequality: residential segregation is more prevalent in the Northeast region of the U.S. as compared to the West and the South, and it heavily depends on the level of black population and black income in metropolitan areas. At the same time, the level of gating is significantly higher in the West and the South compared to the Northeast, and seems more dependent on urban housing characteristics than on macroeconomic characteristics. In addition, percent Hispanic is the one factor which positively and significantly influences the increase in gating in the period between 2001 and 2003. In these respects gating can be considered as the new frontier of urban inequality.
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Gating is a relatively new urban process, which has gained significance particularly in the last decade. The present study focuses on the contemporary link between gating and residential segregation in the context of urban inequality. It seems that by gaining significance as a social process gating if not replacing the process of segregation at least to some extent is becoming as prominent as segregation. Therefore the research question we pose is: Are gating and segregation two forms of urban inequality structurally correlated to a significant extent, thus manifestations of the same or different social disadvantages?
The results indicate that gating and residential segregation are significantly and negatively correlated and seem to be driven by different social structural mechanisms. Instead of reinforcing each other in cities, the two processes seem to be alternative forms or urban inequality: residential segregation is more prevalent in the Northeast region of the U.S. as compared to the West and the South, and it heavily depends on the level of black population and black income in metropolitan areas. At the same time, the level of gating is significantly higher in the West and the South compared to the Northeast, and seems more dependent on urban housing characteristics than on macroeconomic characteristics. In addition, percent Hispanic is the one factor which positively and significantly influences the increase in gating in the period between 2001 and 2003. In these respects gating can be considered as the new frontier of urban inequality.
Social Theory
Social Theory offers an extensive selection of documents that explore the complexities and interpret the nature of social behavior and organization. Particular care has been taken to index this material so that it can be searched more thoroughly than ever before. The current release features more than 122,000 pages of content by such major theorists as Theodor Adorno, Jean Baudrillard, Simone de Beauvoir, Howard Becker, Émile Durkheim, Michel Foucault, Jürgen Habermas, Robert Merton, Dorothy Smith, and Talcott Parsons.
Lewis Coser (27 November 1913–8 July 2003) was an American sociologist.
Born in Berlin (Ludwig Cohen), Coser was the first sociologist to try to bring together structural functionalism and conflict theory; his work was focused on finding the functions of social conflict. Coser argued - with Georg Simmel - that conflict might serve to solidify a loosely structured group. In a society that seems to be disintegrating, conflict with another society, inter-group conflict, may restore the integrative core. For example, the cohesiveness of Israeli Jews might be attributed to the long-standing conflict with the Arabs. Conflict with one group may also serve to produce cohesion by leading to a series of alliances with other groups.
Conflicts within a society, intra-group conflict, can bring some ordinarily isolated individuals into an active role. The protest over the Vietnam War motivated many young people to take vigorous roles in American political life for the first time.
Conflicts also serve a communication function. Prior to conflict, groups may be unsure of their adversary’s position, but as a result of conflict, positions and boundaries between groups often become clarified, leaving individuals better able to decide on a proper course of action in relation to their adversary.
Much like status consistency, conflicts along the same cleavages intensify the severity of the conflict. Cross-cutting cleavages tend to dissipate the severity of the conflict. For example, the coincidence of economic and political disenfranchisement among Palestinians in the West Bank intensify their conflict with Israeli Jews. In contrast, the non-coincidence of economic and political disenfranchisement among Quebecers reduces somewhat the severity of their conflict with English Canada, especially with the rising prosperity of the French Canadian new middle class operating in the public sector and corporate world.
Coser first taught at the University of Chicago and the University of California. He then founded the sociology department at Brandeis University and taught there for 15 years before joining the sociology department of the State University of New York at Stony Brook. [1]
In addition to writing many articles and book chapters, Coser wrote or edited two dozen books, including
The Functions of Social Conflict, 1956
The American Communist Party (with Irving Howe),1957.
Sociological Theory, 1964
Men of ideas, 1965
Political Sociology, 1967
Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict, 1967
A Handful of Thistles: Collected Papers in Moral Conviction, 1968.
Sociological Theory (with Bernard Rosenberg), 1969.
Masters of Sociological Thought, 1970
Thew Seventies: Problems and Proposals (with Irving Howe), 1972.
Greedy Institutions, 1974
The Idea of Social Structure, Papers in Honor of R. K. Merton, 1975
The Uses of Controversy in Sociology, 1976
Refugee Scholars in America, 1984
Conflict and Consensus, 1984
Voices of Dissent (with Maurice Halbwachs), 1992.
The New Conservatives: A Critique from the Left (with Irving Howe), 1999
In 1954, with Irving Howe, Coser established the radical journal, Dissent. Upon his death in 2003, the author of his obituary in that magazine suggested that Coser "always felt himself a marginal man. He was Jewish and non-Jewish; an American and a European; a hardheaded social analyst, committed to rigorous honesty in judgment and deed, and a passionate advocate; a leftist and a critic of the left; a defender of the underdog and something of an elete intellectual mandarin."
Lewis Coser (27 November 1913–8 July 2003) was an American sociologist.
Born in Berlin (Ludwig Cohen), Coser was the first sociologist to try to bring together structural functionalism and conflict theory; his work was focused on finding the functions of social conflict. Coser argued - with Georg Simmel - that conflict might serve to solidify a loosely structured group. In a society that seems to be disintegrating, conflict with another society, inter-group conflict, may restore the integrative core. For example, the cohesiveness of Israeli Jews might be attributed to the long-standing conflict with the Arabs. Conflict with one group may also serve to produce cohesion by leading to a series of alliances with other groups.
Conflicts within a society, intra-group conflict, can bring some ordinarily isolated individuals into an active role. The protest over the Vietnam War motivated many young people to take vigorous roles in American political life for the first time.
Conflicts also serve a communication function. Prior to conflict, groups may be unsure of their adversary’s position, but as a result of conflict, positions and boundaries between groups often become clarified, leaving individuals better able to decide on a proper course of action in relation to their adversary.
Much like status consistency, conflicts along the same cleavages intensify the severity of the conflict. Cross-cutting cleavages tend to dissipate the severity of the conflict. For example, the coincidence of economic and political disenfranchisement among Palestinians in the West Bank intensify their conflict with Israeli Jews. In contrast, the non-coincidence of economic and political disenfranchisement among Quebecers reduces somewhat the severity of their conflict with English Canada, especially with the rising prosperity of the French Canadian new middle class operating in the public sector and corporate world.
Coser first taught at the University of Chicago and the University of California. He then founded the sociology department at Brandeis University and taught there for 15 years before joining the sociology department of the State University of New York at Stony Brook. [1]
In addition to writing many articles and book chapters, Coser wrote or edited two dozen books, including
The Functions of Social Conflict, 1956
The American Communist Party (with Irving Howe),1957.
Sociological Theory, 1964
Men of ideas, 1965
Political Sociology, 1967
Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict, 1967
A Handful of Thistles: Collected Papers in Moral Conviction, 1968.
Sociological Theory (with Bernard Rosenberg), 1969.
Masters of Sociological Thought, 1970
Thew Seventies: Problems and Proposals (with Irving Howe), 1972.
Greedy Institutions, 1974
The Idea of Social Structure, Papers in Honor of R. K. Merton, 1975
The Uses of Controversy in Sociology, 1976
Refugee Scholars in America, 1984
Conflict and Consensus, 1984
Voices of Dissent (with Maurice Halbwachs), 1992.
The New Conservatives: A Critique from the Left (with Irving Howe), 1999
In 1954, with Irving Howe, Coser established the radical journal, Dissent. Upon his death in 2003, the author of his obituary in that magazine suggested that Coser "always felt himself a marginal man. He was Jewish and non-Jewish; an American and a European; a hardheaded social analyst, committed to rigorous honesty in judgment and deed, and a passionate advocate; a leftist and a critic of the left; a defender of the underdog and something of an elete intellectual mandarin."
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